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 Aid through Trade: An Effective Option? 
Arvind Panagariya 
1 Introduction 
What trade policy initiatives can the rich countries such as the United States take to 
assist the poor countries in improving their growth prospects and achieving faster 
alleviation of poverty?  This question has been a subject of research and debate among 
policy analysts in the area of trade and development for more than four decades.  During 
the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, developing countries successfully lobbied for 
the addition of Part IV titled “Trade and Development” to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  Under Article XXXVII of this part, they got developed 
country signatories to commit to “accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of 
barriers to products currently or potentially of particular export interest to less developed 
contracting parties” and to “refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, 
customs duties or non-tariff barriers on products currently or potentially of particular 
export interest” to them.   
Again, in 1971, under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), founded in 1964, developing countries successfully pushed 
for the adoption of the Enabling Clause by the GATT Contracting Parties.  The clause 
was initially adopted for 10 years but renewed later in 1979 for an indefinite period.  It 
gave legal status to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the exchange of 
South-South trade preferences.  The GSP provision gave legal status to one-way trade 
preference by developed to developing countries while the provision on South-South preferences freed developing countries from GATT Article XXIV requirements while 
exchanging trade preferences among themselves. 
Subsequently, encouraged by the 1973 success of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in increasing oil prices, developing countries called for far 
reaching changes in the rules of the North-South engagement under the rubric of the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO).  As a part of this effort, on May 1, 1974, the Sixth 
Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly adopted a manifesto entitled "Declaration 
and Program of Action of the New International Order."  Among the measures proposed 
under NIEO were the indexation of developing country export prices to developed 
country manufactures exports, raising official development assistance to 0.7 percent of 
developed country GNP, linking the creation of the IMF Special Drawing Rights to 
development aid, lowering tariffs on manufactures exported by developing to developed 
countries, development of an international food program and a negotiated redeployment 
of some developed country industries to developing countries.
1 
Unfortunately, few of these efforts during 1960s and 1970s can be said to have 
contributed significantly to growth and development in the poor countries.  Given the 
best endeavor nature of the commitments in Part IV of GATT and the unwillingness of 
the rich countries to give one-way concessions, its addition led to the lowering of few 
barriers facing the products exported by developing countries.  On the contrary, 1960s 
and 1970s saw the grip of textile and apparel quotas, organized under the rubric of the 
Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1974, tighten progressively.  The Enabling Clause did 
                                                 
1 Bhagwati (1977) offers an excellent overview of the NIEO discussions in the rich collection of 
essays by leading trade and development economists of the time that he edited.  Also see Looney 
(1999). lead to the grant of trade preferences under GSP and other schemes but as I discuss later 
in greater detail, these had at most limited impact on the developing country exports and 
proved of questionable value. 
In so far as the NIEO movement is concerned, it was a complete failure.  Beyond 
paying lip service to the proposed agenda, developed countries yielded little.  Instead, 
they chose to delegate the issues of concern to developing countries to the Breton Woods 
institutions in which they held the balance of power.  In turn, these institutions went on to 
aggressively promote liberal trade policies in developing countries themselves.   
Simultaneously, in the aftermath of the Tokyo Round (1974-79), developed countries 
began to insist that developing countries abandon the practice of “free riding” the 
multilateral liberalization negotiated by developed countries and become active parties to 
future rounds of negotiations.  The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 only after 
developing countries agreed formally to participate fully in the negotiations.   
These developments during the last two decades relegated the NIEO agenda to the 
background.
2  But recently, following the Uruguay Round Agreement, the process has 
come full circle.  Perceptions that developing countries got shortchanged in the Uruguay 
Round and that the benefits of the agreement went asymmetrically to the rich countries 
have led to a partial resurgence of the NIEO agenda.
3  Though many of the impractical 
                                                 
2 The process of liberalization in developing countries was aided in no small measure by the 
success of outward-oriented policies in the far eastern economies and the failure of inward-
looking policies in other parts of the world.  Starting in early 1980s, many developing countries 
had begun to appreciate the benefits of their own liberalization as well as the futility of insisting 
on one-way trade concessions from the rich countries. 
3 In Panagariya (2002a), I have argued that the view that the Uruguay Round hurt developing 
countries fails to stand up to careful scrutiny.  Though the balance of the bargain was in favor of 
the rich countries, developing countries benefited significantly from the package as well.  They 
benefited from their own liberalization and the liberalization by developed countries including the schemes proposed under NIEO have been buried for good, moral pressure is being 
exerted once again for one-way concessions from rich to poor countries through trade and 
aid.  Interestingly, this time around the leadership at the Breton Woods institutions has 
joined hands with the United Nations in accusing developed countries of double 
standards and maintaining trade barriers that hurt developing country interests.  
A question that has, therefore, gained salience in the United States is whether the 
changed circumstances make it more feasible for this nation to deploy trade policy 
instruments to assist the neediest developing countries, characterized in this volume as 
the low-income poorly performing states (LIPPS), in their endeavor to achieve faster 
growth reduce poverty.
4  Is there scope for further expansion of the trade concessions by 
the United States to these countries; if yes, does the experience to-date point to the 
desirability of such expansion; and if not are political circumstances favorable to reforms 
that would make the expansion desirable?   
In pursuit of answers to these questions, in the following, I examine the scope for 
and desirability of the U.S. assistance to LIPPS through three separate trade policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
removal of MFA.  The latter is criticized on the ground that it is back loaded.  A much 
unappreciated fact, however, is that many of the uncompetitive developing countries had in fact 
lobbied for the back loading since they feared losing their quota captive market to more 
competitive suppliers such as China.  Developing countries also laid down the foundation of 
future liberalization in agriculture by bringing this sector into the GATT discipline; this was less 
than what they had hoped for but it meant progress.  Developing countries also benefited from a 
much stronger dispute settlement that has allowed them to challenge developed countries on near 
equal footing.  The main cost they paid was the TRIPS Agreement, which was not a win-win 
bargain and entails benefits for developed countries at the expense of developing countries. 
 
4 The Center for Global development, which has introduced this category, defines it as 
comprising countries where poor economic performance and widespread poverty combine with 
governments incapable of guaranteeing political freedoms, providing the foundation for economic 
activity, and controlling their territory.  The Center provides two illustrative lists but does not 
draw a fixed list even at a point in time. 
 measures: one-way trade preferences as, for example, under GSP; bilateral trade 
preferences as under free trade area arrangements as under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement; and multilateral 
trade liberalization as under the Uruguay Round Agreement in products of interest to 
developing countries.  Based on the accumulated experience of the past forty years, my 
principal conclusion is that of these three forms of market access, only the last one is both 
desirable and feasible.   
The record of one-way trade preferences by the United States and EU has been quite 
poor and there is little reason to believe that this will change in the near future.  These 
preferences have been selective, uncertain and subject to all kinds of side conditions.  On 
balance, the EU preferences have been less arbitrary but even they have failed to generate 
significant impact on growth in the beneficiary countries.    
Likewise, the potential for free trade areas between the United States and LIPPS is 
limited and their value questionable.  Currently, with the attention focused on Latin 
America, few free trade areas with LIPPS are on the U.S. trade policy radar screen.  But 
even if that were not the case, it is far from clear that two-way trade preferences would 
succeed where one-way preferences have failed.  For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement has given few reasons for celebration in so far as Jordan’s economic 
development is concerned.    
Therefore, multilateral liberalization under the auspices of the Doha Round remains 
the best available option.  This liberalization is subject to the WTO discipline and cannot 
be withdrawn at will.  It is also free of trade diversion that plagues free trade areas.  And above all, it has the potential to induce non-discriminatory liberalization in LIPPS 
themselves. 
A final qualification must be added before I proceed to the detailed discussion of 
these themes.  Further opening of developed country markets, no matter what form it 
takes, can help LIPPS only in a limited way.  Despite all the rhetoric and assertions to the 
contrary, the bitter and sad truth is that even if developed countries were to open their 
markets fully without asking for reciprocal liberalization and without any side conditions, 
few LIPPS will succeed in achieving significant growth and poverty reduction purely as a 
consequence of this opening up. The explanation for the poor growth performance of 
many LIPPS is to be found not in the barriers to their exports in the rich countries--
though these barriers do impose a burden on them--but in their own domestic policies and 
political environment that governs the internal investment climate. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that though the external environment facing 
all developing countries has been the same during the past several decades, their 
performance has been far from the same.  Some of them have managed to register much 
higher growth rates than others.  They have accomplished this principally because of their 
superior economic policies rather than special market access favors granted them.   
During 1950s through 1970s, most developing countries took the pessimistic view that 
the world economic order was rigged against them and chose inward-looking policies.  
But countries such as the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong did the 
opposite, opting to go for the world markets.  The result was spectacular growth on a 
sustained basis.  This experience has been repeated subsequently by such countries as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, People’s Republic of China, India and Vietnam in Asia, 
Chile in Latin America and most recently Uganda in Africa.   
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I offer an overview of the LIPPS 
and barriers facing their exports, especially in developed countries.  In Section 3, I 
address the role of further one-way trade preferences and in Section 4 that of bilateral 
arrangements such as free trade areas (FTAs).  In Section 5, I consider the multilateral 
option.  The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
2  Barriers to LIPPS Exports: An Overview 
By definition, low-income poorly performing states consist of countries with low 
per-capita incomes and poor performance along some specified dimensions.  CGD 
defines “low-income” countries as those having per-capita incomes below $1435 at 2001 
U.S. prices.  This is the level used by the World Bank to identify countries eligible for its 
concessional lending window, International Development Association or IDA.  There are 
74 countries that fall below this cutoff point.   
Invoking the governmental performance criteria narrows down this set further.  CGD 
measures the governmental performance along two dimensions: political freedom to the 
constituents and ability to preserve the rule of law.  Following the “political freedom” 
criterion, ceteris paribus, countries that lack institutions that protect civil liberties, hold 
governments accountable for their actions, and allow citizens to participate in the 
political process are more likely to be included in the LIPPS list.  In the same vein, 
following the “rule of law” criterion, countries that lack proper laws and institutions that 
enforce contracts, protect property rights, punish criminal behavior and discharge efficiently the administrative functions of the government have a greater chance of 
ending up on the list.   
Using alternative indicators of the government quality, CGD offers two illustrative 
lists of LIPPS.  These are reproduced in Table 1.  Approximately three-quarters of the 
illustrative LIPPS are from Africa and include important regional powers such as Nigeria, 
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The lists also extend to countries in 
other regions characterized by poor governance along one or the other dimension: 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in South Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan in Central 
Asia, and Laos in Southeast Asia.  With a population of more than 125 million, 
Bangladesh is the largest LIPPS.  With a per-capita of $100 in 2001, Burundi and 
Ethiopia are the poorest. 
The criteria used to identify LIPPS are highly correlated with those used to identify 
the least developed countries (LDCs) by the United Nations.
5  Not surprisingly, three 
quarters of the countries on the illustrative LIPPS lists are also categorized as LDCs by 
the United Nations.  This commonality allows us to exploit the detailed information 
                                                 
5 The United Nations introduced this category in 1971.  It includes nations deemed structurally 
handicapped in their development process and in need of the highest degree of consideration from 
the international community in support of their development efforts.  The U.N. Economic and 
Social Council, which makes the determination, considered three factors: income, human 
resource weakness and economic vulnerability.  The income criterion requires that based on a 
three-year average, the annual per-capita GDP be below $900.  Currently, there are 49 such 
countries and the list is revised every three years.  The last revision took place in 2000.  With 
some exceptions, the countries on the CGD illustrative lists of LIPPS form a subset of the U.N. 
list of least developed countries.  Only four LIPPS--Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Nigeria and 
Pakistan--out of a total of 22 states on the first LIPPS list in Table 1 and five (four on the first list 
plus Tajikistan) out of 23 states on the second LIPPS list do not appear on the current U.N. list of 
least developed countries. 
 
 collected by UNCTAD on LDCs to gain further insight into the economic performance of 
LIPPS.  
During 1990-98, the real GDP of LDCs as a group grew by 3.2 per cent per annum 
compared with 3.4 per cent for the low- and middle-income countries and 2.5 per cent for 
the world (UNCTAD 2000).  This relatively favorable comparison is tempered by two 
facts.  First, the bulk of the LDC growth represents growth in one country, Bangladesh, 
with one-fifth of the total LDC population.  Excluding Bangladesh, the growth rate was 
more modest at 2.4 percent.  Second, the growth rate of population in LDCs was much 
higher than that in other developing countries.  As such, on per-capita basis, LDC 
incomes grew only 0.9 percent during 1990-98.  If we exclude Bangladesh, this figure 
drops to 0.4 percent.  Over the same period, other developing countries grew at 3.6 
percent in per-capita terms. 
Behind these aggregate numbers, there is substantial variance in the performance 
across LDCs.  The top 15 LDC performers during 1990-98 have all grown at 2 percent or 
more in per-capita terms.  At the other extreme, 22 LDCs were either stagnant or declined 
in per-capita terms.  In 11 LDCs, which were all subject to armed conflicts and internal 
instability and would therefore qualify for inclusion into the LIPPS list, the real per-
capita GDP declined at 3 percent or more annually during 1990-98. 
The share of LDCs in world trade declined from 3.04 percent in 1954 to a tiny 0.42 
percent in 1998.  The bulk of this decline took place during 1960s and 1970s though there 
was a slight decline during 1990s as well.  In 1999, LDCs sent 27 percent of their exports 
to the United States, 37 percent to EU, 4 percent to Japan, 1 percent to Canada, 2 percent 
to other developed countries, 1 percent to each other and 28 percent to other developing countries.  Thus, overall, they sent 71 percent of the exports to developed countries and 
29 percent to developing countries.   
Table 2 provides the weighted applied tariff rates facing LDCs in various regions of 
the world in 1999.  It is evident from this table that the countries face the highest tariffs in 
South Asia: 28 percent in agriculture and fisheries and almost 25 percent in 
manufactures.  In contrast, the corresponding rates in developed countries are 2.1 and 4.4 
percent, respectively.  All developing country regions impose higher barriers to LDC 
exports than developed countries. 
Table 3 offers further details on the status of trade barriers in 1998 facing LDCs 
in the Quad countries (Canada, EU, Japan and U.S.A.), which account for most of their 
exports to developed countries.  Among the four countries, EU offers LDCs the least 
restrictive trade regime.  In 1998, only 3.12 percent of LDC exports to EU faced any 
tariffs.  In contrast, in the United States, 47 percent of the LDC exports faced tariffs 
exceeding 5 percent.  A similar pattern is also observed in terms of the proportion of 
tariff lines subject to tariffs.  Furthermore, LDCs are able to register positive export in 
many more product lines in EU than the United States. 
The lead enjoyed by EU in offering trade concessions to LDCs has been 
strengthened following the adoption of the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative by it 
in February 2001.  Under this initiative, EU has introduced duty and quota free entry to 
all products from LDCs with three important exceptions (plus arms and ammunition, of 
course).  The three excluded products are bananas, rice and sugar.  They are to be given 
unlimited duty free access starting January 2006, July 2009 and September 2009, respectively.  Currently, two of the products, rice and sugar, are subject to limited tariff-
free quotas, which are to be increased annually. 
3  One-way Trade Preferences 
To assess possible benefits from further expansion of trade preferences by the United 
States, we must consider three questions: is there substantial scope for this expansion; if 
yes, does the experience to-date support the desirability of the expansion; and if not, do 
political circumstance offer an opportunity to reform the system such that the expansion 
is made desirable.  Consider each of these questions in turn. 
3.1  The Scope for the Expansion of Trade Preferences 
The United States offers trade preferences under GSP, Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and Andean 
Trade Preferences Act (ATPA).  None of the beneficiary countries of ATPA and CBPTA 
fit the LIPPS bill.  Therefore, the discussion below is limited to GSP and AGOA. 
The US GSP program was introduced in 1976.
6  Since the program carries an 
expiration date, it has had to be renewed eight times over the last 26 years.  The last 
expiration took place on September 30, 2001 and the last renewal August 6, 2002. The 
latest renewal validates GSP until December 31, 2006.  Currently, of more than 10,000 
items, 4,600 are accorded duty-free status under the program.  In 1997, the United States 
added another 1,700 items to the duty-free list for LDCs though stricter criteria allow 
only 35 of the 49 LDCs to qualify for the expanded preferences.  According to WTO 
                                                 
6 Many of the details on the U.S. GSP program in this paper have been taken from The GSP 
Coalition (2002). (2001), GSP beneficiary countries paid an average tariff of 4% in 2000, which is 1.5 
percentage points below the average MFN tariff rate. 
Trade and Development Act 2000, which contains AGOA, seeks to expand trade 
with sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.  AGOA offers eligible SSA countries, many 
of them LIPPS, duty-free and quota-free access to the U.S. market for all products under 
GSP plus 1,800 new items until September 30, 2008.  Under special conditions, it also 
extends duty-free status to apparel, which is subject to high tariffs in the United States.  
Furthermore, AGOA eliminates the GSP competitive-need limitation, which can 
otherwise be invoked to withdraw duty-free status when imports from a country exceed 
certain limits.  To-date, 35 countries have been granted the beneficiary status. 
Despite these concessions, there remains considerable scope for the expansion of 
trade preferences by the United States to LIPPS.  The United States preferences fall far 
short of those granted by EU under its EBA initiative.  According to UNCTAD (2001b), 
a little more than 45 per cent of total LDC exports in 2000 were eligible for better-than-
MFN access to the United States market.  Although more than 80 per cent of all HS6-
level products qualified for duty-free access that year, if petroleum products are excluded, 
this share drops down to 49.6 percent.  Furthermore, not all LDC exports eligible for 
preferences actually receive preferential treatment.  Thus, the utilization ratio was 76.5 
per cent in 1998. 
  Some insight into the nature of excluded products can be obtained by examining 
the top 20 LDC exporters to the United States according to their product classification 
and preference status.  This is shown in Table 4.  Of the 20 exporters, none of the manufactures exporters received any preference.  The only countries receiving tariff 
preferences on the list were those exporting tobacco and perhaps oil.   
An examination of the products with tariff peaks reinforces this picture.  Various 
apparel items, which are subject to tariff peaks, are excluded from GSP.  AGOA permits 
duty free entry of these items but requires exporters to have a strict visa system to ensure 
origin.  Until April 2001, only two LDCs, Lesotho and Madagascar, were able to fulfill 
this requirement.  Of these two, only Madagascar appears on one of the two LIPPS lists 
in Table 1. 
3.2  Does the Past Experience Make the Expansion of Preferences Desirable?
7 
If the objective is to see LIPPS grow faster, the past experience offers little support 
to the concentration of efforts on the expansion of trade preferences.  The preferences 
may make the donor countries feel good, transfer some of the foregone tariff revenue to 
the beneficiary countries and may even lead to a marginal expansion of the latter’s 
exports.  But the track record of preferences to-date gives little reason to conclude that 
they will make a perceptible difference to growth and poverty in the beneficiary 
countries. 
EU preferences are by far the most extensive of all in so far as LDCs and African 
countries are concerned.  Yet, the record of these preferences is quite disappointing.  
Under Lomé IV, recently succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement, 71 African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries including many LDCs have enjoyed highly favorable trade 
regime.  Yet, a 1997 European Commission ‘green paper’ published as a preparatory step 
                                                 
7 This section draws on Panagariya (2002b). towards the 1998 talks for the extension of the Lomé IV offered a grim assessment.  It 
reported that the share of ACP countries in the EU market had declined from 6.7 percent 
in 1976 to 3 percent in 1998.  Merely 10 products accounted for 60 percent of the total 
ACP exports to EU.  Per-capita GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by only 0.4 percent 
per-annum compared with 2.3 percent for all developing countries from 1962 to 1992.  At 
most, a handful of nations, Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Jamaica, none of 
which were LDCs, have benefited perceptibly from the preferences. 
Empirical studies supports the broad conclusion that trade preferences have had 
little beneficial impact beyond the obvious rent transfer accompanying duty-free entry of 
goods.
8  In his assessment of the impact of the special and differential treatment to 
developing countries under GATT, Whalley (1990, p. 1319) concludes as follows:  
“The paper suggests that available empirical studies, limited as they are, seem to point 
to the conclusion that special and differential treatment has had only a marginal effect 
on country economic performance, especially through GSP.  And in the more rapidly 
growing economies, such as Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and others, there is little evidence 
that special and differential treatment has played much of a role in their strong 
performance.” 
As noted in the introduction, the limited or no impact of trade preferences on 
economic performance is to be attributed principally to domestic policy regimes that 
discourage economic activity in general and trade in particular.  But many features of the 
                                                 
8 See Baldwin and Murray (1977), Grossman (1982), Sapir and Lundberg (1984), Brown 
(1989), MacPhee and Oguledo (1991) and Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian (2002). 
 preference schemes themselves complement this factor by making preferences largely 
ineffective.  These are discussed below. 
3.2.1 Side  Conditions 
Despite the provision in the Enabling Clause that GSP schemes be unilateral and 
not require reciprocity from developing countries, donor countries have introduced a 
considerable element of reciprocity in them.  The U.S. GSP scheme requires that 
beneficiary countries provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights and take steps to observe internationally recognized worker rights.  There have 
been many instances of countries losing GSP benefits on account of poor intellectual 
property rights regime.  Countries have also been investigated for child labor related 
violations.  AGOA attaches even more elaborate side conditions.  Eligibility requires 
countries to work towards strengthening market based economies, promote the rule of 
law and political pluralism, elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, 
protection of intellectual property, efforts to combat corruption, policies to reduce 
poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities, protection of 
human rights and worker rights, and elimination of certain child labour practices.   
On one hand, these conditions seem sensible if the objective is to promote good 
governance in LIPPS.  And yet, they become hindrance to investments that might help a 
beneficiary country to take advantage of the preference.  For the conditions introduce an 
element uncertainty about the continuity of the preferential status.  Whenever U.S. 
producers feel threatened by competition from a specific beneficiary country, they can 
lobby for the removal of the latter from the beneficiary list under the pretext that it is 
failing to satisfy one of more of the host of governance conditions.  There have been several instances of the U.S. pharmaceutical firms successfully lobbying against countries 
it saw as failing to protect intellectual property rights.  Because the preferences are not 
subject to any WTO discipline, such decisions can be made unilaterally by the United 
States. 
3.2.2 Product  Selectivity 
In addition to non-reciprocity, the Enabling Clause requires that preferences by 
“generalized,” meaning that they be extended to all products.  Nevertheless, given the 
“permissive” rather than “mandatory” nature of the Clause, countries have been highly 
selective in their choice of products, excluding precisely the products in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage.  It has already been noted that both 
EU and the United States give very limited preference in textiles and clothing sectors.  
Table 4 illustrates graphically how the United States has left the top exports of LDCs out 
of the preference net.  More importantly, they have maintained strict import quotas on the 
imports of these products from all significant suppliers under the Multi-fiber 
Arrangement (MFA).  Indeed, it was not until developing countries opted for reciprocal 
bargains in the Uruguay Round that the united States, EU and other developed countries 
agreed to dismantle the MFA regime.
9 
  This point applies even more forcefully to agricultural exports.  Until recently, 
agricultural products have remained virtually entirely out of even the more generous EU 
                                                 
9 Even as the MFA and other quantitative restrictions are dismantled, threats of anti-dumping and 
other contingent protection measures loom large.  Irrespective of whether or not such threats are 
carried out and when carried out whether or not they succeed, their mere presence may have a 
lasting effect on the exporters.  Thus, for example, though the recent EU attempts to impose AD 
duties on unbleached cotton imports from five emerging markets failed, the attempt itself led to 
considerable disruption of markets for the developing country-exporters who were so targeted. GSP schemes.  Only recently, the EBA initiative, aimed exclusively at LDCs, attempted 
to bring them into the GSP net.  But even this attempt seems to have been more symbolic 
than real.  Thus, three major items of potential interest, rice, banana and sugar, have been 
left out of the EBA net.  What is surprising is that the publicity surrounding the EBA 
initiative notwithstanding, the potential for agricultural exports from the least developed 
countries is minimal.  For example, given the paltry 2,000 tons of annual rice exports by 
LDCs to EU, there is little rationale for the failure of EU to grant them immediate quota-
free entry of that product.  A similar point also applies to sugar. 
3.2.3  Uncertainties and Other Limitations 
Uncertainties and other limitations further undercut the value of the GSP schemes.  
The schemes are made available for limited periods of time and can expire if not 
renewed.  The U.S. GSP scheme has gone through eight renewals since inception and 
there have been breaks during most of those renewals.  For instance, the last expiration 
took place on September 30, 2001 and renewal did not take place until August 6, 2002.  
Such breaks can be fatal for producers operating on small margins of profit as is likely for 
many LDC producers. 
The U.S. GSP system also applies a competitive needs limit whereby a country is 
denied the preference in a product if it exports that product in value exceeding a pre-
specified limit.  Currently, this limit is set at $100 million per year per tariff line.  This 
provision necessarily discourages countries from taking full advantage of specialization. 
Finally, the side conditions mentioned above can be invoked to deny a potential 
competitor the GSP benefit.  Within the U.S. system, this often happens in response to complaints by domestic producers whose objective is to place a particularly efficient 
supplier from a developing country at a disadvantage. 
These limits and uncertainties discourage potential entrepreneurs from making the 
necessary investments.  Amar Hamoudi of the Center for Global Development made this 
point forcefully in the context of AGOA in a recent letter to the Financial Times (June 6, 
2002).  To quote him, 
“Take the recent case where a consortium of US fruit producers asked the Bush 
administration to suspend South Africa's AGOA benefits on canned pears, arguing 
that the expansion of the industry in South Africa threatened to put a handful of 
Americans out of work. Fruit producers in South Africa protested that AGOA did not 
induce them to expand production, since the necessary investments were too risky 
given that the benefits granted by AGOA can be revoked at any time. Producers in 
Africa can expect that any time they succeed in taking true advantage of AGOA, 
some special interest group in the US will demand that the benefits be rescinded.” 
3.2.4  Rules of Origin 
Favorable impact of tariff preferences on LDC exports has often been contained 
by the rules of origin that such exports must satisfy.  In principle, in so far as preferences 
are meant for goods produced in the beneficiary countries, rules of origin are 
unavoidable.  For in their absence, beneficiary countries would simply import goods from 
more efficient non-beneficiary countries and re-export them as their own, pocketing the 
tariff revenue in the process. 
Nevertheless, the rules of origin can be and are chosen in ways that minimize the 
benefit of the preference to exporters and result in reverse preferences to producers in the donor countries.  The commonest such rule makes the preference contingent on a 
minimum value addition to the product within the exporting country.  According to the 
U.S. GSP scheme, to qualify for duty free treatment, the cost, or value of materials 
wholly grown, produced, or manufactured in the beneficiary developing country plus the 
direct processing costs there must be at least 35% of the product’s dutiable value. This 
requirement can be a major deterrent since many LIPPS are able to perform only simple 
assembly operations.  Indeed, it can discriminate against LIPPS since larger and richer 
developing countries are able to take advantage of the preference due to their ability to 
satisfy the rules of origin whereas they are not.  Effectively, trade can be diverted away 
from them relative to no tariff preference. 
The AGOA rules of origin on apparel also introduce an element of reverse 
preferences.  They require that fabric used in apparel be of the U.S. or beneficiary 
country origin.  Such a feature introduces a rent on the fabric made in the U.S. especially 
because few African beneficiary countries produce it.  Though this rule of origin is 
waved for less developed African countries (defined as those with per-capita incomes less 
than $1,500) in place of a visa requirement, few of them are able to satisfy the latter and 
even then there is a strict quantitative limit placed on such exports. 
3.2.5  Adverse Impact on the Beneficiary- and Donor-Country Liberalization  
Tariff preferences can also discourage liberalization within the beneficiary 
countries themselves.  Hudec (1987) noted this many years ago when he wrote, “the non-
reciprocity doctrine tends to remove the major incentive that [GSP beneficiary country] 
export industries have...for opposing protectionist trade policies at home.”  Once 
exporters have achieved free access to the markets of major trading partners, their incentive for using internal liberalization as an instrument of encouraging the partner to 
open its market disappears.  Alternatively, if exporters fear losing GSP status because 
exports cross a certain threshold as is true of many GSP schemes, they may be more 
accommodating of protectionist policies at home. 
Recent econometric research by Ozden and Reinhardt (2002) supports this 
hypothesis. These authors analyze a panel dataset of annual observations on each of the 
154 developing countries ever eligible for the United States GSP program, starting in the 
year of first eligibility (mostly 1976) and continuing through 2000.  Comparing those 
countries remaining on GSP to those dropped, they find that the countries dropped from 
the program open their markets substantially.   
Specifically, according to their quantitative estimates, the removal from GSP 
program has the effect of boosting a developing country's imports by 8 percent of its 
GDP, cutting its average nominal tariff by 4 percentage points, and reducing the duties it 
collects by about 1.6 percent of the value of its trade.  These findings control for a wide 
variety of confounds (like geography, income, GDP size, and global liberalization 
trends), and the response rises slightly after correction for the endogeneity of GSP. 
Ozden and Reinhardt offer the example of Chile, whose trade liberalization had 
come to a standstill by the late 1980s.  In 1988, it was dropped from the US GSP program 
for human and worker rights violations.  Its finance minister immediately announced a 
reduction in Chile's average nominal tariff from 20 to 15 percent; his explicitly stated 
rationale being to compensate for its exporters' loss of competitiveness in the US market 
by defraying their input costs. Ironically, preferences have also had an adverse effect on genuine, multilateral 
trade liberalization by developed countries in products of interest to developing countries.  
Notwithstanding various strings attached to the preferences, they have helped developed 
countries promote the image that they have opened their markets to developing countries 
without reciprocity.  More concretely, the fear on the part of the beneficiary countries that 
multilateral liberalization would erode their preference margin has undercut their 
incentive to push harder for such liberalization.  To some degree, special deals built 
around trade preferences have allowed developed countries to maintain MFA and high 
tariffs in apparel, footwear and fisheries. 
3.3  Is reform Possible: The Politics of Preferences 
Devotees of preferences may respond to these criticisms by suggesting that the 
fault lies not with preferences but with their implementation and what is required is more 
judicious implementation.  That is to say, GSP must be reformed as per their original 
conception in the Enabling Clause, making them truly general by bringing all products 
within the fold, freeing them of reciprocity by eliminating the side conditions and ending 
the uncertainty by ensuring that export success in specific products does not result in the 
loss of the preference. 
If these reforms could be accomplished, GSP will be worth promoting.  But given 
their politics in the United States, there is little reason to think that such far-reaching 
reform could ever be achieved.  In the introduction, I have described the disappointing 
history of developing country efforts to obtain one-way concessions from developed 
countries.  The GATT Article XXXVII in Part IV actually committed developed 
countries to open their markets in products exported by developing countries and to refrain from erecting new barriers in those products.  But no progress whatsoever was 
made with tariff peaks and agricultural protection having disproportionately greater 
limiting impact on the exports of developing countries.  The MFA quotas reinforced these 
restrictions.    
The politics of trade preferences is even worse.  The United States clearly sees 
them as a privilege rather than right and therefore subject to the use as an instrument of 
promoting other policy objectives.  For instance, given the U.S. failure to bring labor 
standards into WTO to-date, it is more likely to use preferences as an instrument of 
promoting labor standards.  Given all kinds of side conditions even in AGOA, it is naïve 
to think that a proper reform of trade preferences is possible even as applied to LDCs.  
Hence, I am skeptical that trade preferences can serve as a genuine instrument of aid. 
Of course, even if one considers the hypothetical scenario in which the trade 
preferences to LIPPS are freed of all these abuses, one must take into account the adverse 
impact of the preferences on trade policies within LIPPS before reaching a final 
conclusion on the desirability of such a reform.  One must confront the evidence provided 
by Ozden and Reinhardt that countries that were successful in taking advantage of the 
preferences also found their own trade liberalization programs slowdown. 
4  Two-way Preferences: Free Trade Areas  
An alternative to one-way trade preferences is Free Trade Area (FTA) in which 
preferences are two-way.  There are two principal advantages that can be claimed for an 
FTA over one-way preferences.  First, FTAs in which one or more developed countries 
participate are subject to the discipline of GATT Article XXIV.  This means some of the 
abuses of one-way preferences under the Enabling Clause can be contained in such FTAs.  For example, substantially all products must be subject to the zero duty and no limits can 
be placed on the quantity of exports entering the partner country market at zero duty.  
Nor can the preference be arbitrarily withdrawn in response to domestic lobbying 
pressures on one pretext or the other.  Second, an FTA arrangement forces the developing 
country participant to open its own market to the developed country partner as well.  
Therefore, it may be viewed as having a liberalizing impact on the developing country as 
well. 
But these advantages must be weighed against many disadvantages.
10  First, like one-
way preferences, FTA trade preferences are also subject to the rules of origin.  The costs 
of rules of origin are not confined merely to higher prices of inputs sourced from within 
the union but also include substantial administrative costs.  Using firm-level data, 
Koskinen (1983) has estimated that within the FTA between the European Community 
(EC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), administrative compliance costs ranged 
between 1.4% and 5.7% of the value of export transactions.  In a similar vein, Holmes 
and Shephard (1983) have noted that the average export transaction from EFTA to EC 
required 35 documents and 360 copies.  According to the empirical evidence, within 
NAFTA, even Mexico has not been able to make use of the tariff preference effectively 
in some of the key sectors due to the rules of origin.  Thus, according to Cadot et al. 
(2002), after we exclude the goods subject to zero external tariffs, Mexico’s overall 
preference utilization rate in the U.S. market in 2000 was 83 percent.  But in textile and 
                                                 
10 For more in-depth critiques of preferential trade arrangements, see Bhagwati (1993), Bhagwati 
and Panagariya (1996), Bhagwati, Greenaway and Panagariya (1998) and Panagariya (1999).  
Panagariya (2000) offers a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on these 
arrangements. 
 apparel sector (HTS2 chapters 50-63) where the margin of preference is the highest and 
the Mexican comparative advantage greatest, the utilization rate is only 66%.  Within 
textiles and clothing, the utilization rate for knitted products (HTS2 chapter 61) was even 
lower at 48%.   The ability of LIPPS to satisfy the rules of origin is likely to be far more 
limited than of Mexico so that they are unlikely to succeed in taking advantage of the 
preferences. 
  Second, side conditions are now increasingly a part of FTAs as well.  Within 
NAFTA region, these were introduced through relatively benign side agreements on labor 
and environment.  But subsequently, they have begun to appear centrally within the FTA 
agreements concluded by the United States.  Thus, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement requires the signatories to enforce their labor and environmental regulations 
and allows trade sanctions in case of non-compliance.  The same provision also exists in 
the free trade agreement concluded recently by the United States with Singapore and 
Chile.  Indeed, these latter agreements extend the scope of side conditions further by 
limiting the ability of Singapore and Chile to use capital controls.  The EU FTA 
agreements do not include these conditions but they are themselves usually a part of 
broader agreements such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Cotonou Agreement, 
which are wide-ranging in scope and include such matters as human rights, democracy 
and labor and environmental standards. 
  Third, given the imports into many LIPPS are still subject to relatively high trade 
barriers, preferential liberalization by them is likely to result in substantial trade 
diversion.  The cost of such diversion will have to be borne by these countries since they 
will be the ones paying the higher price to the union partner in preference to the lower price they pay to the most efficient supplier of the product in the absence of the FTA.  
Thus, when liberalization takes place on a discriminatory basis, as is true under an FTA, 
benefits of liberalization are not automatic.  We must weigh the losses due to trade 
diversion against the benefits from trade creation.  This point becomes particularly 
compelling when we consider the fact that politics often results in the rules of origin that 
are tighter in sectors where trade creation threatens the less efficient domestic industry 
and weaker in sectors where trade diversion is likely to displace the more efficient 
outside trading partners. 
  Finally, before embarking on a strategy of aiding specific poor countries through 
a web of crisscrossing FTAs, the United States carries the responsibility of ensuring that 
it does not lead to a fragmentation of the entire trading system.  Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996) have drawn attention to the growing “Spaghetti bowl” of tariffs whereby the tariff 
on a product is no longer the simple MFN tariff but instead depends on the source 
country.  It varies according to the stage of implementation of the FTA to which the 
source country belongs and the rules of origin within that FTA.  Even after all FTAs are 
fully implemented, the differences in the rules of origin across FTAs will continue to 
allow for discrimination in the tariff rates based on the source country.  Sapir (1998) has 
made the dramatic point that EU already has so many preferential arrangements that its 
MFN tariff applies uniformly to only six trading partners.  Any attempts at helping LDCs 
further through FTAs will only damage the trading system further. 
  Even if we choose to ignore these limitations, the political reality is that it will be 
a long time before FTAs with LIPPS even appear on the U.S. trade policy radar screen.  
The countries with which the United States has concluded the last two FTAs are far from poor: Singapore and Chile.  The next set of countries in the queue includes five Central 
American nations, Morocco, Australia and several southern African states.  Also on the 
agenda is the Free Trade Area of the Americas.  In so far as the FTAs are concerned, the 
U.S. preoccupation is hardly with LIPPS. 
5 Multilateral  Liberalization 
Having argued that neither one-way nor two-way trade preferences offer a desirable 
or feasible approach to aid LDCs through trade, I now suggest that the best course is to 
opt for the multilateral approach.  I reiterate that this will not be a cure all medicine for 
LIPPS since the principal barriers to their development are within rather than outside.  
But in so far as trade can be instrumental in promoting or facilitating faster growth in the 
presence of sound domestic policies and stable investment environment, multilateral 
liberalization is to be preferred for a number of reasons. 
First, multilateral liberalization does not carry with it the fear of trade diversion since 
it treats all trading partners equally.  Nor does it require any rules of origin since the 
market access is given independently of the origin of the product.  Second, the 
liberalization is a legal obligation and therefore cannot be withdrawn at will.  Domestic 
lobbies have only limited power to temporarily withdraw the market access through 
safeguards and anti-dumping actions.  In the case of small exporters, a qualification 
fulfilled by virtually all LIPPS, even this power is limited.  Third, multilateral 
liberalization has the great virtue that it will also lead to liberalization in some of the 
large developing countries.  Recall that as shown by Table 2, LDCs including LIPPS face 
by far the highest trade barriers today in developing countries.  In so far as the latter do 
not give GSP preferences and south-south preferences are limited, liberalization by them could be doubly valuable to LIPPS.  Fourth, in principle, multilateral liberalization has 
the potential to induce liberalization in LIPPS as well, which is a desirable objective.  
LIPPS governments are likely to find it politically less costly to liberalize in the 
multilateral context since they can mobilize the export interests against import-competing 
interests in the context of a two-way bargain.  Fifth, it is only through multilateral 
bargains that developing countries including LIPPS will succeed in opening up fully 
developed country markets in products such as apparel and footwear in which they have a 
comparative advantage.  As already argued, this has been one unequivocal lesson of the 
last forty years of experience.  Finally, at least for now, multilateral liberalization does 
not carry the risk of side conditions in the form of labor and environmental standards.  
Though the environment has now entered the WTO negotiating agenda, the mandate is 
extremely limited while labor standards have remained entirely outside the WTO 
purview. 
An obvious important reason for pushing ahead with the multilateral approach at 
present is its political feasibility.  The Doha Development Round is in progress at present 
and at least in the area of industrial products, both EU and United States have placed 
ambitious liberalization proposals on the table.  If the larger developing countries such as 
Brazil, China and India could be induced to make similarly bold moves, we have the 
opportunity to virtually eliminate trade barriers against industrial products.  The U.S. 
proposal calls for complete elimination of these barriers by 2015.  To facilitate such an 
outcome, developing countries could be given a longer phase out period, say until 2020 
under the Special and Differential treatment mandate in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
and offered adjustment assistance through the instrumentality of the World Bank.  There is one point of caution relating to agricultural liberalization, however, that 
deserves to be highlighted in the context of the Doha Round.  In the last two or three 
years, senior officials at various multilateral institutions, especially the World Bank and 
IMF but also United Nations, have aggressively promoted the view that agricultural 
subsidies and protection in the OECD countries hurt the poor countries.  In so far as 
LDCs are concerned this is plain wrong.  The subsidies and protection in the OECD 
countries have kept the world prices of agriculture low.  This has benefited the countries 
that import these products but hurt those that export them.  As it turns out, by and large, 
LDCs are net importers of agricultural products.  Thus, Based on 1995-97 trade data, 
Valdes and McCalla (1999) calculate that of the 48 LDCs at the time, 45 are net food 
importers and 33 net agricultural importers.
11  The repeal of agricultural subsides and 
protection in the OECD countries, which will raised the world agricultural prices, will 
actually hurt LDCs as a group.  Unqualified statements that agricultural subsidies and 
protection in the rich countries hurt the poor countries, pervasive in the press these days, 
do little good to promote the interests of LDCs as a group.  Instead, they principally 
promote the interests of the richer developing countries in Latin America and East Asia, 
along with those of the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
I hasten to add that this asymmetry is not an argument against liberalization of 
agriculture.  From the long-run global perspective, there are good reasons to ensure an 
end to agricultural subsidies and protection under the ongoing Doha negotiations.   
Nevertheless, the recognition that such liberalization will hurt the majority of the poorest 
countries is the necessary first step towards working out a balanced bargain as well as 
                                                 
11 This point is made more systematically in Panagariya (2002c). preparing for the adjustment assistance to these countries.  The World Bank clearly has 
the responsibility to alleviate the pain that might accompany the rise in agricultural prices 
through grant-in-aid. 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
During the last fifty years, developing countries that pursued outward-oriented 
policies under a realistic exchange rate and macroeconomic stability, such as the 
countries in the Far East during 1960s and 1970 and Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, China, India, Chile and Uganda subsequently, have achieved fast growth under 
the same market access conditions that other countries failed.  Despite high barriers 
against specific labor-intensive goods in the rich countries, these countries have 
succeeded in penetrating the developed country markets.  Failure to grow rapidly on a 
sustained basis has come largely from the failure to adopt sound domestic policies and 
ensure political stability, which are essential to promote productive investment.  Even 
among the poor countries, 11 worst failures during 1990-98 that declined by 3 percent 
annually in per-capita terms were all subject to armed conflicts and internal instability. 
Thus, the hope for countries that do not have their own houses in order is truly 
limited, indeed.  It is tempting to think that favors through trade preferences of one or the 
other kind that are contingent on good governmental policies may induce the necessary 
change in behavior in LIPPS.  I fear this is wishful thinking.  Countries that are unable to 
exploit trade preferences in the absence of the side conditions are unlikely to be able to 
do so in their presence.  Few governments that lack the capacity to enforce contracts and 
protect property rights to begin with are likely to become capable in these dimensions 
because trade preferences are available as a reward.  Therefore, all the side conditions do is to make it politically easier for the donor country to offer the preferences since they 
reduce the likelihood that the preference will be used and make it possible to take 
restrictive action if imports from the beneficiary countries surge.   
The upshot of this analysis is that we must be modest in thinking about the role of 
the U.S. trade policy in assisting LIPPS.  We may think along two possible avenues.  
First, recognizing that trade preferences are here to stay, what improvements can be made 
to make them more beneficial to LIPPS?  And second, recognizing that multilateral 
liberalization offers the best route to promoting access to the U.S. market, precisely what 
can be done to accommodate the interests of LIPPS? 
Regarding the first question, given how limited the capacity of LIPPS to export is, in 
the spirit of EBA, the United States could extend the zero tariff treatment to all products 
imported from them.  To make the preference credible, it could also consider eliminating 
all side conditions.  Furthermore, for all commodities subject to a higher rate of tariff in 
the beneficiary country than in the United States, rules of origin may be waived entirely.  
This is because there is no incentive for a third country to export an item to a higher tariff 
LIPPS for re-export to the United States at zero tariff; direct entry into the United States 
will result in lower tariff paid.  Finally, the United States could commit to maintaining 
the preference for at least 15 years or until such time as the preference is eliminated by 
multilateral liberalization.  Only then potential investors will have the incentive to 
establish production capacity in the otherwise highly risky LIPPS environment. 
On the multilateral front, it is critical for the United States to take the Doha 
negotiations to their logical conclusion.  An immediate area where the United States 
could give concession to the benefit of LIPPS is intellectual property.  Virtually none of the LIPPS is capable of taking advantage of the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement due to the absence of domestic capacity to manufacture drugs.  The 
United States has essentially held up an agreement that would allow these countries to 
issue compulsory license to manufacture drugs to other countries.  LIPPS would also 
benefit from an elimination of peak tariffs on industrial tariffs since these cover labor-
intensive products such as apparel and footwear.  But my preference would be to push the 
current U.S. proposal to eliminate all industrial tariffs by the year 2015.  As a part of the 
Special and Differential treatment, LIPPS can be given a longer phase out, say, until 
2025.  
In the area of agriculture, it is worth reminding that despite much publicity recently 
that rich-country protection and subsidies in this sector hurt the poor countries, the 
removal of these interventions will on balance hurt the LDCs and perhaps LIPPS as a 
group.  Based on the 1999 data, of the 49 LDCs, 45 are net importers of food and 33 net 
importers of agriculture.  These countries will be hurt rather than benefit from the 
increase in the prices of these products that will follow the removal of the subsidies and 
protection. Therefore, it is important that the liberalization in this sector be accompanied 
by adequate compensation to these countries in the form of extra IDA assistance by the 
World Bank. 
In the matter of the Singapore issues, LIPPS should be given considerably longer 
implementation time than other countries.  The experience from the Uruguay Round has 
been that these countries lack the resources even to enact legislation necessitated by these 
complex agreements let alone enforce them.  Indeed, it may even make sense to exempt these countries from implementation until they reach a pre-specified level per-capita 
income. 
A final point concerns the U.S. pursuit of FTAs.  Under the Bush Administration, the 
United States has substantially accelerated the move towards preferential trade 
arrangements.  There is not a single LIPPS currently on the U.S. FTA list, however.  This 
means that in so far as LIPPS have any capacity to export to the United States, FTA stand 
to divert trade from them.  For example, the U.S.-South Africa FTA will likely divert 
imports into the United States from Kenya.  Indeed, if the FTAA is concluded, trade from 
Africa and Asia which house virtually all LIPPS is bound to be diverted.  This fact makes 
the case for multilateral liberalization under the Doha Round even stronger. References 
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§ 
 
The Worst Performers based on Per-capita 
Income and Political Freedom 
The Worst Performers based on Per-capita 
Income and Rule of Law: 
Afghanistan Afghanistan 
Burundi Bangladesh 
Central African Republic  Benin 
Chad Burkina  Faso 
Comoros Burundi 
Democratic Republic of Congo  Chad 




Guinea-Bissau Kyrgyz  Republic* 
Kenya* Laos 












§The countries in column 1 are among the bottom 40 based on both per-capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) in 2001 and the index of political freedom.  The countries in 
column 2 are among the bottom 40 based on both per-capita GNI in 2001 and the index 
of the rule of law. 
*Not a least developed country. The countries without an asterisk are least developed 
countries. 















































































































































































                
Agricultural and fishery products  2.1  28.3  7.6  14.8  11.9 14.0 11.0 1.7  6.0 
                
Crustaceans  (live)  0.7  16.4  15.1 30.0 14.3 9.4 11.5  0.7 1.8 
                
Other fish  1.8  13.8 12.8  14.6  9.6  22.7 19.3  1.8  6.0 
                
Edible fruit and nuts  0.1  38.0 13.0  17.0  8.9  6.4  23.5  0.0  24.0 
Coffee and substitutes with coffee  0.0  35.0 16.3  12.7  7.4  0.9  4.5  0.0  1.7 
Oil seeds and miscellaneous grain, seeds 
and  fruits  0.4  33.4 8.1  11.2  5.8 14.1 7.6 0.3 4.4 
Other agricultural and fishery products  5.1  13.0  29.2 16.8 18.4 3.2  7.8 5.3 6.9 
              
Minerals and fuels  0.0  6.5  14.4  5.9  0.7  4.5  9.3  0.0  2.9 
                
Ores, slag and ash  0.0  5.0  12.0 N . e .  0.0  1.3  n.e.  0.0  0.1 
Crude and refined petroleum oil  0.0 30.0  20.0  6.0  3.9  4.5  15.4  0.0  3.6 
                
Other minerals and fuels  0.0  5.0  n.e.  5.2  0.0  3.0  10.8  0.0  2.2 
                
Manufactures  4.4  24.7  12.6  10.3 8.0 2.4 7.4  4.5  5.0 
Rubber, leather and footwear products  2.8  13.0  12.7 11.5 13.8 1.4 17.4  2.6 3.4 
                
Wood and Wood Products  0.4  7.7  11.5  18.1 3.2 2.0 5.8  0.3  2.2 
                
Cotton  products  0.3  4.5  11.9 8.4  0.0 2.0 1.0  0.0  2.1 
Knitted or crocheted articles  8.3  35.7  16.0 26.3 21.1 1.8 24.0  8.4 8.5 
Non-knitted or crocheted articles  7.2  35.5  13.3 20.8 22.9 6.2 13.4  7.2 7.4 
                
Diamonds 0.0  40.0  4.2  4.5  5.0  0.3  n.e.  0.0  0.0 Other manufactured products  0.5  34.5 11.2  7.5  1.9  2.7  8.9  0.2  2.0 
Other products not elsewhere specified  3.3  28.8  5.2 10.7 7.9 7.5 7.0  2.1  8.3 
Total by Geographical Region  3.5  25.5  8.9  9.7  9.4  4.5  8.8  3.4  4.9 
 
n.e.: no exports 
 
Source: UNCTAD and World Bank (2001) 
 Table 3: The pattern of protection facing LDC exports to the Quad countries, 1998 
(Thousand Dollars) 
 
 Canada  EU  (Pre-EBA)  Japan  USA 
        
Total LDC exports (1)  227 677  9 874 807  1 019 120  6 962 416 
Total imports in product lines of LDC (2)  83 670 842  637 766 105  126 378 101  528 279 235 
Total imports (3)  211 085 424  783 684 206  305 438 116  1 015 143 866 
LDC share of competitive imports ( (1) / (2) )  0.27%  1.55%  0.81%  1.32% 
LDC share of total imports ( (1) / (3) )  0.11%  1.26%  0.33%  0.69% 
        
Total HS6 tariff lines  758  2222  545  946 
in lines with protection  201  55  74  335 
of which above 5%  181  51  36  282 
        
LDC Exports entering duty free  103 260  9 566 647  498 534  3 596 270 
LDC Exports dutiable  124 417  308 160  520 586  3 366 146 
LDC Exports dutiable above 5 %  123 827  308 134  226 274  3 272 917 
        
Share of LDC exports facing protection  54.60%  3.12%  51.10%  48.30% 
Share of LDC exports facing tariff > 5%  54.40%  3.12%  22.20%  47.00% 
        
Share of HS6 lines with tariff  18.50%  4.20%  12.10%  17.10% 
Share of HS6 lines with tariff > 5%  12.80%  3.80%  7.60%  14.10% 
 
Source: UNCTAD (2001b) 
 Table 4: Top 20 HS6 LDC Exporters to the U.S., 2000 
 
   Value   Preferential 
HS 6 Code  Description  (US$000)  Country  margin (%) 
270900  Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous  2 488 009  Angola  n/a 
 minerals,  crude      
270900  Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous  337 349  Congo  n/a 
 minerals,  crude      
620520 Apparel  193  570  Bangladesh  0 
620342 Apparel  184  549  Bangladesh  0 
650590  Headgear and parts thereof  165 258  Bangladesh  0 
620342 Apparel  155  759  Cambodia  0 
620462 Apparel  152  775  Bangladesh  0 
620630 Apparel  127  913  Bangladesh  0 
610910  Knitted apparel  125 935  Haiti  0 
260600  Aluminium ores and concentrates  116 814  Guinea  0 
30613  Shrimps and prawns  115 046  Bangladesh  0 
270900  Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous  109 067  Zaire  n/a 
 minerals,  crude      
611020  Knitted apparel  106 662  Cambodia  0 
620462 Apparel  85  251  Cambodia  0 
611030  Knitted apparel  80 848  Bangladesh  0 
611020  Knitted apparel  77 042  Bangladesh  0 
710231 Diamonds  73  949  Zaire  0 
610821  Briefs and panties  56 182  Bangladesh  0 
620193 Apparel  55  669  Bangladesh  0 
240120 Tobacco  52  535  Malawi  31.11 
Source: UNCTAD (2001b) 